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This paper examines the small projects fund, an EU-funded initiative to promote good citizen relations across borders. The paper presents this fund as an attempt to foster ‘social capital’ in the Polish-German border region. The fund is examined in light of seven conditions of social capital formation. In the Polish-German border region, the fund scores well on the first four conditions, related to the promotion of individual trust. It performs less well on the three conditions for scaling up individual trust to form social capital. However, it remains to be seen whether small project support can deliver improved citizen relations. 
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Dieser Artikel behandelt den Kleinprojektefonds, eine EU-finanzierte Initiative, die gutnachbarschaftliche Bürgerbeziehungen über Grenzen hinweg fördert. Der Fonds kann in der deutsch-polnischen Grenzregion als ein Versuch, ‚Sozialkapital’ aufzubauen, gewertet werden. Er wird hier im Hinblick auf sieben Voraussetzungen für die Entstehung von Sozialkapital analysiert. In der deutsch-polnischen Grenzregion schneidet der Fonds bei den ersten vier Voraussetzungen, die das zwischenmenschliche Vertrauen betreffen, gut ab. Weniger gut erfüllt der Fonds drei Voraussetzungen, um individuelles Vertrauen in Sozialkapital zu umzuwandeln. Es bleibt daher abzuwarten, ob der Kleinprojektefonds dauerhaft die Bürgerbeziehungen verbessern kann. 
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The aim of this paper is to examine the link between cross-border policy-making on the one hand and citizen relations across the border on the other. It does this by scrutinising the so-called ‘small projects fund’ in the Polish-German border region. This EU-funded policy initiative is aimed specifically at bringing people together in order to improve citizen relations across borders. 

Academic interest in border regions has flourished in the past two decades. Borders in Europe have received particular attention because they tend to be unusually open to cross-border traffic of goods or people (ANDERSON, 1996; O’DOWD, 2002). Moreover, in Western Europe, there have been special efforts to promote cooperation between border regions and municipalities since the 1950s. Similar efforts have recently also been transferred to the Central and East European borders (PERKMANN, 2003). These schemes are particularly important here. Unlike many West European borderlands, Central and East European border regions often do not benefit from any unbroken centuries-old links. Borders in this part of Europe typically look back on a recent history of violence, expulsion and walling-off (BATT and WOLCZUK, 2002). 

Much of the empirical research has focussed on cross-border governance and policy (PERKMANN, 1999; SCOTT, 2002; KEPKA, 2004). Other researchers have examined relations among border populations (LISIECKI, 1995; ZICH, 1998; SZABO and KONCZ, 2006). Usually, however, policy-making and social relations are treated separately, as if policy had no impact on border populations and the local setting did not shape regional networks.​[1]​ Where there have been analyses of policy attempts to bring people together, such as the small projects fund, research has all too often consisted of mere assumptions about the beneficial effect of cross-border cooperation or of reasoning by analogy with Western European cases (GRIX and KNOWLES, 2002; YODER, 2003). 

In order to develop a more rigorous way of assessing the impact of cross-border policy-making, this paper examines two aspects of the small projects fund. First, it describes the fund’s implementation. In particular, it elaborates seven tests of potential policy impacts. This is done by employing the concept of social capital, in other words a combination of trust and cooperative networks among those living on the borders, the borderlanders. The paper shows that there are preconditions for the development of social capital. These can be used to assess policy design: policies to stimulate social capital are well-designed if they fulfil most or all of these conditions. Second, the paper reviews actual cooperation experiences in order to determine the impact of small projects on the level of social capital in the Polish-German borderlands. 

The analysis is based on documentary evidence and on semi-structured interviews with border regional policy-makers that were conducted in two waves in 2005 and in 2009. The documentary evidence includes guidelines issued by the European Commission, Euroregional publications and evaluations of the cross-border programmes. Interviews covered the detailed workings of the fund as well as assessments of its contribution to social capital formation. Fourteen interviews were conducted with policy-makers whose expertise covers the fund’s operations. These include regional policy-makers who coordinate cross-border cooperation and representatives of the so-called Euroregions, that is to say those organisations that implement the small projects fund. Additionally, in order to probe the fund’s impact on the ground, fourteen interviews were conducted with the types of organisations that organise cross-border projects in the areas of education, economics and culture. Ultimately, the effect of small projects can only be assessed by consulting the participants themselves but, in the absence of any information about participants’ opinions, interviews with project organisers are a suitable approximation. To safeguard confidentiality, all 28 interviews are referenced numerically, indicating whether they were conducted with a Pole (PL) or German (DE).

This paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the concept of social capital. It shows how social capital comes about and derives seven conditions for social capital formation from the literature. The second section introduces the case study and demonstrates why social capital is important in the Polish-German border region. The third section describes the origins of the small projects fund, how it is implemented, and what it entails at the Polish-German border. The fourth section tests the small projects fund against the seven conditions of social capital formation. The fifth section presents the views of project organisers on whether and how citizen contacts in projects have served to increase the stock of social capital in the Polish-German border region. The paper concludes by highlighting five policy implications of the research.


1)	Social capital: meanings, origins and prerequisites 




The term ‘social capital’ is used to denote networks and trust relationships between different people. As the word ‘capital’ indicates, it is seen as a valuable property which facilitates social, political and economic life. Social capital is sometimes perceived as the individual ability to achieve one’s particular ends (e.g. COLEMAN, 1988). Other social scientists go beyond this individualistic definition. For example, Robert Putnam, in his famous Bowling alone, describes networks and trust as public goods: 

A society characterized by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter. If we don’t have to balance every exchange instantly, we can get a lot more accomplished. Trustworthiness lubricates social life. (PUTNAM, 2000: 21)

Trust is seen as confidence in other people’s dependability (LEVI, 1998). In high-trust environments, transaction costs for democratic processes or economic productivity are said to be noticeably lower than they are in low-trust societies (PUTNAM et al., 1993; FUKUYAMA, 1995; WHITELEY, 2000). However, social capital can also have negative consequences, as illicit organisations such as the mafia benefit from it. Within certain groups, it can lead to the exclusion of outsiders (DURLAUF, 1999). Putnam has put forward an important distinction between the type of social capital that is usually seen as beneficial and the type that might lead to negative outcomes. The former takes the shape of inclusive relationships that bridge the gap between different groups. Examples include cooperative undertakings such as ecumenical organisations or attempts to promote international understanding. Putnam refers to this as ‘bridging social capital’ (PUTNAM, 2000: 22). Conversely, ‘bonding social capital’ is oriented towards group cohesiveness and tends to be more exclusive and inward-looking. Examples include the trust relationships within nationalist groups or clans which seem more likely to reject others (PORTES, 1998).

A feedback loop is clearly implied in either notion of social capital: if trust reduces transaction costs and if lower transaction costs in turn justify trust and increased interaction, then society is experiencing a virtuous circle (PUTNAM et al., 1993). Similarly, if a lack of trust prevents any effective solutions to social and policy problems, the stalemate would tend to be self-perpetuating. This may capture something of the self-reinforcing nature of social capital. However, it obscures the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Putnam claims that social capital increases efficacy but it seems equally plausible that efficient government or economic development inspire social capital (FOLEY and EDWARDS, 1999; USLANER, 2003). For the analyst, it is important to draw a clear distinction between the causes and the consequences of social capital (PORTES, 1998). 

1.2 Origins
The question of how social capital comes about in the first place has so far been answered only partially. Francis FUKUYAMA (1995) argues that trust is culturally determined and cites various historical reasons to explain variation between different contexts. Still, he does not reflect on the origin of these differences. It has been suggested that cooperative initiatives emerge spontaneously and that they are self-reinforcing in most circumstances. However, certain negative conditions may prevent the growth of social capital (BOIX and POSNER, 1998). Potential obstacles include a high degree of inequality as well as weak law and order (WOOLCOCK, 1998; USLANER, 2003). The interesting question, then, ‘is not why cooperation exists but rather why it does not’ (BOIX and POSNER, 1998: 688). 

There is an obvious policy relevance to the question of where social capital comes from. If it is true that social capital brings social benefits, then there is a strong incentive to look for ways to foster social capital. For example, successive World Development Reports describe social capital as part of the solution to poverty (FINE, 1999). Similarly, ‘Poland 2030’, the country’s major development plan for the next twenty years, argues that the modernisation and development of Poland’s economy is highly dependent on its social and intellectual capital (ZESPOL DORADCOW STRATEGICZNYCH PREZESA RADY MINISTROW, 2009). 

PUTNAM (2000: 21) has suggested that ‘frequent interaction among a diverse set of people’ brings about social trust: through interaction, people get to know each other and familiarity generates trust. Social capital, too, is said to be determined by:

…the extent to which individuals have regular contact with others, beyond the sphere of the family or the market, and notably the kind of face-to-face relations of relative equality associated with participation in common endeavours, whether recreational, social, service-oriented or political (HALL, 1999: 418).

While contact may bring about social capital, it is less certain that public-sector intervention can initiate social capital formation by fostering such contact. If social capital is seen as personal trust relationships that are built from the bottom up, it may look as though state intervention has no place in its development. Thus, FUKUYAMA (1995; 2000) suggests that state interference and bottom-up activism are fundamentally at odds. Much of the social capital literature views top-down central state regulation as substituting or ‘crowding out’ spontaneous citizen initiatives (VAN ORSCHOOT et al., 2005; ZIJDERVELD, 1998). 

Conversely, HALL (1999) has argued that British government policy has helped to stimulate citizen involvement in the voluntary sector. Good government and working institutions tend to bring about general trust (LEVI, 1998; KUMLIN and ROTHSTEIN, 2005). Similar findings relate to the context of social capital’s influence on development outcomes: ‘paradoxical though it may seem, “top-down” efforts are usually needed to introduce, sustain, and institutionalize “bottom-up” development’ (UPHOFF cited in WOOLCOCK, 1998: 179; EVANS, 1996). 

Clearly, there is a dispute between those who view state intervention as futile or counterproductive and those who consider it necessary in order to support citizen engagement. In an attempt to reconcile this tension, it has been argued that government input is helpful only where there is demand for certain goods or activities that citizens themselves cannot fulfil (EVANS, 1996). This will be elaborated below.

1.3. Preconditions of social capital formation
There has been no single analysis that identifies all preconditions of social capital formation. However, several different studies have illuminated different aspects of the process. From a thorough review of the literature, one can extract at least seven favourable conditions for the development of social capital. Four of them are connected with how encounters promote trust between individuals:
- Role of government: Government intervention can be useful to kick-start citizen cooperation if the public sector provides those resources that are not available to the citizens (EVANS, 1996: 1121). Thus, an initial governmental input is helpful. Once cooperation has been set in motion, government should hold off to avoid stifling citizen initiative.
- Local knowledge: The local knowledge of government representatives is essential (MOORE, 1989). Ideally, they should be based in the region where they operate because an understanding of local problems and trusting relationships with the population are crucial. 
- Common endeavour: Encounters should be tied to a common endeavour, be it ‘recreational, social, service-oriented or political’ (HALL, 1999: 418). This is important to give participants a topic of common interest rather than presenting the encounter as an end in itself.
- Finally, the quality of communication is important (KLEIN-HITPASS et al., 2006). Thus, encounters designed to build trust should be personal and thorough. In a cross-border setting, it helps when citizens speak each other’s language. 

Another major question is how to broaden interpersonal trust to encompass social trust in society more generally. The main problem ‘is not social capital at the level of local communities but rather “scaling-up” such personal and community ties’ (EVANS, 1996: 1125). Scaling-up takes place when people who are involved in inter-group contact generalise from their favourable opinions of another person to favourable attitudes towards and trust in the other group as a whole (ALLPORT, 1979). The literature on social capital offers a few hints how this might be achieved:
- First, policy should be directed at broad segments of society in order to maximise the target audience (PUTNAM, 2000). This means that policy initiatives should aim to reach as many different kinds of people as possible.
- Second, since contact takes a while to bring about social trust (EVANS, 1996; HALL, 1999), interaction should be repeated or take place over an extended time period in order for contacts to deepen. 
- Third, policy initiatives should rise above the immediately local context and try to bridge different local communities. For example, it is helpful for contacts at the interpersonal or local level to be linked to a larger scale, such as a whole region (FOX, 1994). 

An overview of the conditions that promote social capital formation indicates that attuning policy to these seven factors can maximise impact. These factors can be used as tests of successful policy design in order to develop a theoretical model for assessing policy. The aim of what follows is to test the preconditions for social capital formation against the experiences in the Polish-German border region, which has witnessed a number of attempts to create social capital after the post-Cold War opening of the border. Before this is done, though, the next section shows why social capital is in such demand in the region.

2)	Border regions’ special need for social capital: the Polish-German case
Border regions are traditionally seen as peripheral due to their distance from the respective state’s geographical, economic and political core (VAN HOUTUM, 2000). At the same time, the permeability of borders is a crucial determinant of border regions’ standing (MARTINEZ, 1994). Central and Eastern Europe has a tradition of largely closed borders, aggravating histories of conflict and distrust (e.g. JOHNSON, 2009). The Polish-German case is emblematic. The border was the product of aggression and forceful boundary redrawing during World War II. Due to the mass expulsions of Poles and Germans, the people who found themselves living on both sides after the war had never had any experience with joint neighbourship (URBAN, 2004). For most of the communist period, the border was closed to cross-border contact. 

After the end of communism and German unification, important bilateral efforts were made to improve Polish-German relations both officially and between the citizens. In November 1990, the Polish and German governments signed the Treaty Confirming the Existing Border. Shortly thereafter, in June 1991, a Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation was signed which pledged consultation at all governmental levels and cooperation in a number of areas such as economics, science, culture and education. Article 12 promised support of cooperation at the subnational level, especially between regions, towns and municipalities across the border. Finally, in April 1991 an agreement on visa-free travel came into force. 

While the bilateral background after November 1990 was favourable, the border region experienced significant problems. After forty years of communist management – most of that time under a closed border regime – the Polish-German borderlands experienced major material setbacks. They suffer from 1) the decline in heavy industry and resulting unemployment, 2) insufficient cross-border infrastructure, and 3) demographic challenges, especially migration from the German side of the borderlands (e.g. FREISTAAT SACHSEN, 2004; LAND BRANDENBURG, 2004). Perhaps most importantly, the border coincided with a steep welfare gap: even though Germany’s poorest regions border on some of Poland’s wealthier regions, the German side is still much more prosperous than the Polish (BERTRAM, 1998; GORZELAK, 2000). Against this bleak outlook, a host of studies argued that such a region had few development chances and that much-needed development capital would skip the borderlands to do business in the large cities (KRÄTKE, 1999; GUZ-VETTER, 2002). 

Recent years have witnessed broader development concepts, both in Poland and in Germany, that link development to social and intellectual capital (ZESPOL DORADCOW STRATEGICZNYCH PREZESA RADY MINISTROW, 2008; 2009; ALWERT and VORSATZ, 2005). Under this view, social capital is seen to precede economic development and is just as important as institutions or economic background conditions. For the Polish-German border region, this means that economic and political relations in the borderlands will be affected by how the people, and especially firms, on both sides of a border relate to each other: ‘Relationships of trust are essential to “high quality” cooperation and interfirm networks seem to develop more easily in regions where the economic and social actors have a common sociocultural background’ (KRÄTKE, 2002: 139). 

Trusting relations are not always easy to achieve. When the border was opened in 1991, the people who lived on both sides of the border did not know, and were suspicious of, each other (LISIECKI, 1995). Relations between Poles and Germans were shaped by stereotypes and prejudices (LISIECKI, 1995; MATTHIESEN, 2002). The fact that the Polish-German region was a ‘low-trust environment’ tended to hold back any much-needed cross-border cooperation between small local firms (KRÄTKE, 1999: 632; KRÄTKE, 2002; GUZ-VETTER, 2002). In other words, the region found itself in a vicious circle where concerted regional cooperation would be necessary to activate the region and improve both sides’ well-being. However, mutual suspicions inhibited such cooperation. 

While a low trust environment may hamper economic development, there is another reason why social capital is in high demand in border regions. It relates to the effectiveness of cross-border governance. Popular support is a precondition for efficient cross-border governance (MATTHIESEN, 2002). Joint problem solving can produce economies of scale between the cooperating local and regional authorities in such fields as spatial planning, infrastructure development or environmental protection (SCHERHAG, 2008). However, such synergies require a minimum of trust among the border populations:

In the end, it is the population’s support, acceptance and interests that determine the success of cross-border cooperation. As long as views of the neighbour are shaped by negative stereotypes and prejudices, the ‘border in the head’ will persist (SCHERHAG, 2008: 30).​[2]​

Robert KNIPPSCHILD (2008: 73) describes a hypothetical scenario in which cooperation is, in fact, the optimum solution for everybody. However, citizens’ willingness to use infrastructure on the other side are a precondition for this success: shared facilities such as binational kindergartens, jointly used hospitals or recreational facilities will only be successful if they are accepted and used by the border region residents (MATTHIESEN, 2002; KNIPPSCHILD, 2008). 

Thus, after the border was opened, there was an urgent need to improve citizen relations and to try and foster social capital that can bridge the border, or bridging social capital. Despite occasional bilateral spats, the national context was generally favourable and produced many efforts to promote better relations between the citizens. For example, the Polish-German Youth Association was founded by the two national governments in 1991. It was modelled on a similar Franco-German institution that has promoted contacts between young people since the 1960s. 

Shortly after the agreement on visa-free travel came into force in 1991, regional authorities and towns alike began to cooperate across the Polish-German border. In particular, four Euroregions were founded between 1991 and 1995: Neisse-Nisa-Nysa; Spree-Neisse/Nysa-Bóbr (SNB); Pro Europa Viadrina; and Pomerania (ZDULSKI, 2002). Euroregions are voluntary associations of territorial-administrative units that straddle national boundaries (KEPKA, 2004). These together make up the territory of a Euroregion, and they also select the members of joint Euroregional institutions such as a council that lays down the broad strategy or the Euroregion offices that manage the Euroregion’s daily affairs. All four Polish-German Euroregions have the common goals of improving living standards in the border regions and bringing together citizens from both sides. 

At the same time, the border still constitutes an important geographical barrier. It coincides with two rivers and, despite investments in infrastructure, there was still an urgent lack of border crossings more than fifteen years after the border was opened (KNIPPSCHILD, 2008). Furthermore, Germany was one of the many West European countries that excluded Central and Eastern Europeans from their labour markets after the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Accordingly, Poles would only be able to work in Germany after 2011, a decision that may have soothed some German fears of Polish competition but that also hindered cross-border commuting and exchanges in the workplace. 

As we have seen, the Polish-German border was in an economically and socially difficult position after the end of communism. Since then, the European, national and regional contexts have been favourable and have promoted development initiatives and citizen encounters across the border. In order to examine social capital formation in the region, the next section introduces a major policy tool that aims to promote the trust and networks across the border: the small projects fund.

3)	The small projects fund in the Polish-German border region
The European Union’s Community Initiative INTERREG has been the main funding instrument for cross-border cooperation in Europe since its introduction in 1990 (PERKMANN, 2003). INTERREG money can only be spent on the territory of EU member states. Prior to their accession in 2004 (2007 in the case of Bulgaria and Romania), the Central and Eastern European member states received money from the mirror fund Phare CBC. In the 2007-2013 funding period, INTERREG has been upgraded to become one of the key objectives of cohesion policy, European Territorial Cooperation or Objective 3. 

The small projects fund that is funded through these instruments attempts to engage the people who live on both sides of the border. The European Union does not itself set aside a share of its cross-border funds for small projects. However, the programme managers at the different borders have the option of setting up a small projects fund for ‘people-to-people’ projects such as sports festivals or meetings between clubs. Small projects are dedicated to the specific purpose of bringing people from both sides together in a meaningful setting. The aim is for borderlanders to get to know and start trusting each other and to improve good neighbourly relations. Projects take place in the areas of culture and sport, tourism or youth exchanges. 

3.1 History
The concept of a small projects fund originated in the Polish-German border region as part of the INTERREG II-Phare CBC programme (ZDULSKI, 2002). In 1995, there was a conviction that measures were needed to foster trust between the citizens of both sides (Interviews PL4 and DE3). However, under the Phare CBC regulations, projects had to be worth at least two million Euros. This was seen as too much for the purposes of people-to-people projects. Thus, Polish local administrations set aside between two and three million Euros per year for small projects (JALOWIECKI and SMETKOWSKI, 2004). INTERREG money was made available on the German side. The small projects funds were managed in the Euroregion offices themselves. 

An evaluation of the Polish-German cross-border programme describes the small projects fund as one of the programme’s successes, ‘convincing the European Commission of the usefulness of this solution. The Polish innovation was popularized and effectively implemented in other cross-border co-operation programmes in the entire European Union’ (IRC et al., 2006: 9). Indeed, introducing small projects funds as part of cross-border programmes, though not obligatory, is encouraged. Thus:

…measures covering this type of cooperation are eligible, especially the creation of funds with limited resources (micro project facility) to implement small projects promoting cross-border integration of local populations (people-to-people actions) whose management could be [devolved] directly to the programme Secretariat, cross-border initiatives (e.g. Euroregions) or specific Steering Committees (DG REGIO, 2003).


3.2 Management and implementation
Arrangements vary between different programmes across the EU. The programmes’ monitoring committees decide on the financial resources of the small projects fund, the maximum value of eligible projects, and aid ceilings. It is difficult to paint an exact picture of the fund in 52 different programmes across the EU. In general, it seems that small projects funds are more common in Central and Eastern European programmes which had received Phare CBC funding until their EU accession. 

In contrast to regular – or large – projects, the small projects fund often benefits from simplified application procedures. Its administration is devolved to a very large extent to the Euroregion offices. The German offices normally deal with German applications and the Polish ones with Polish applications, as each side also receives its own money. In the 2007-2013 funding period, Euroregion Pomerania will be the exception to this rule: it created a joint office for the small projects fund in Szczecin where all applications will be submitted, but there are still two separate funds. 

The Euroregion offices have special staff to deal with the small projects fund. They advise applicants and help them in the application process, accept applications, assess their formal correctness and consider their content (ZDULSKI, 2002). Finally, local steering committees bring both sides of the Euroregion together to decide jointly whether or not a project will be funded. It usually takes only two or three months between the initial application and the decision. Once a funding decision is made, the project can go ahead. The project organiser must finance the project in advance. The Euroregions conduct the financial monitoring and occasional on-site checks, help the project organisers with the write-up of the final report and, finally, reimburse the project organiser’s expenses according to the relevant aid rate. Projects can last up to a year but most take only two to seven days.

There is an open, standing call for applications but, in general, there does not seem to be much publicity about the possibility of conducting a project (Interview DE8). There is a strong demand for these projects (Interview DE4). Numerous project organisers undertake projects fairly regularly and are familiar with the rules. Others hear about funding opportunities through informal channels. Only non-profit public bodies are eligible to apply for a project. These include municipalities, NGOs, chambers of commerce and other public organisations. Applicants must be based in the Euroregions, which is also where the project must take place. They must have a partner from the other side. Finally, projects must be joint insofar as they must carry out at least two of the following tasks jointly: preparation and planning, implementation, financing or employing personnel from both sides. Often projects are directed at so-called multipliers, that is individuals or organisations with a positive influence over other people, including teachers, churches, sports clubs and other organisations (Interviews PL11, DE10, DE14 and DE15).

3.3 The projects: numbers, cost and content




Usually, projects attract Poles and Germans in equal shares. It is very difficult to estimate how many participants were reached in the past funding period. The number of direct participants can be anywhere between 15 and 1,000. It normally lies between 20 and 100. For some public projects, the number of indirect participants – people who attend a picnic or sports festivals – can reach several thousand. Based on an extrapolation of Euroregional records of concluded projects, one can estimate the number of direct and indirect participants in small projects in the past funding period at somewhere between 150,000 and 300,000.​[3]​ This is a conservative estimate which, out of a total border regional population of around 4.3 million, amounts to a considerable share for a policy intervention aimed at individual citizens.





The prominence of cultural project is due party to a perception of culture as a major instrument to promote exchanges (Interviews PL8, DE11 and DE16). Thus, ‘culture is the best vehicle for international understanding’ (Interview PL8); however, ‘it requires a certain amount of sophistication’ on the part of participants (Interview DE16). Moreover, not all cultural projects are equally popular. A day trip to the Polish city Szczecin experienced considerable interest among German borderlanders but there was no interest among welfare recipients in such a day trip organised specially for them (Interviews DE16 and DE17). Indeed, two interviewees claimed that it was vital to tap into an existing interest among participants. Joint vocational training, for example, was singled out as an area that automatically motivates participants and brings about more natural contacts than certain cultural projects (Interviews PL9 and PL11). 

Some projects are used to fund conferences or publications, but the majority appear to be genuine ‘people-to-people’ projects. For example, many projects involve sporting competitions such as the ‘Europe Marathon 2005/06’ in the Polish-German twin town Görlitz-Zgorzelec or a 2007 angling competition in the Polish town Kłodawa. Other examples include a vintage car exhibition in Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina that took place in 2007. 2,000 visitors who were interested in vintage cars, old fire trucks or military vehicles attended the exhibition (EUROREGION PRO EUROPA VIADRINA, 2008). One might also mention a youth theatre that allowed Polish, German and Czech teenagers to explore local legends from Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa. As part of the project, they learned how to communicate in spite of the language barrier. The play’s success led to longer-term cooperation within the theatre group and to plans to broaden the membership (EUROREGION NEISSE-NISA-NYSA, n.d.). As a one-day event, a Polish-German culinary fair took place in December 2006 in the Polish town Świebodzin: Poles and Germans from two neighbouring districts attended to taste regional specialties and admire regional handicrafts, while local musicians played Christmas songs (EUROREGION SPREE-NEISSE/NYSA-BOBR, 2008). These events offer a variety of sites for borderlanders to meet and communicate. 

4) Conditions of social capital formation in the Polish-German border region
The previous section introduced the main features of the fund, in particular how it is implemented and what it covers. Before offering an initial appraisal of the fund’s impact on the ground, this section maps its characteristics onto the conditions for the development of social capital in order to use these as tests of successful policy design.

As far as the role of government is concerned, the literature suggests that an initial government input can be beneficial but that governments should show restraint once cooperation has been initiated. The history and implementation of the small projects fund indicate that it fulfils this condition. As shown earlier, the small projects fund was created in 1995 and it has been running the same way ever since: the programme managers at the national and regional level set aside a certain amount of money and they leave implementation largely to the Euroregions. In general, the small projects fund is less bureaucratic and more easily implemented than large projects (IFS, 2003). 

The second condition concerns the local knowledge of government representatives. In this respect, the devolved implementation structures of the small projects fund are a real asset. Special members of staff in the Euroregional offices help local initiators such as clubs or municipalities with the preparation of projects. These project organisers themselves, such as the angling clubs of the towns Kłodawa and Seelow, are based in the territory of the Euroregion, where they also have their own membership. They are in an excellent position to organise projects in their area of interest and expertise. 

The third condition stipulates that cross-border contact be tied to a common endeavour. By their nature, small projects are linked to a common theme such as angling or vintage cars. Figure 1 has shown, using the example of Euroregion SNB, that there is quite a broad range of themes, though most fall into the area of culture and youth. Projects use a common interest as a starting point, and project organisers recruit the direct participants from their membership. In other words, the participants of these projects share a pre-existing interest that offers a suitable topic for cross-border exchanges. 

The quality of communication is another key condition of successful cross-border encounters. The small project setting promotes intensive, face-to-face contact between the participants, and they meet on an equal footing. Such a setting is conducive to communication. It will most likely not reproduce any old stereotypes but rather explode them (LISIECKI, 1995). However, communication is hindered by the limited language skills among borderlanders. According to one German interviewee, ‘if Poles did not speak German relatively well, many things would be even more difficult. Over there, the willingness to learn German is much stronger than here’ (Interview DE7; also PL1). Moreover, interviewees argue that project participants should be encouraged to interact at all stages of the project (Interviews DE7 and DE8). However, it is not always clear that this is the case. One interviewee argued that not all projects are successful in bringing people together:

You often find this division, where a project organiser attached little importance to this – perhaps because he is not sensitive enough. Then Poles are among themselves and Germans are among themselves … But where people are sensitive and have tried to prevent this, by playing guitar around the camp fire, people come together in the end. And they do end up talking to each other.’ (Interview DE8).

In general, there are ways to maximise high-quality communication, but the language barrier poses a considerable obstacle.

A second set of conditions relates to the scaling-up of interpersonal trust to broader relationships of trust and social capital in the region. This might be difficult to achieve through the small projects fund because knowledge about this fund among potential applicants cannot be taken for granted. As we have seen, applicants are often specialised organisations that operate in their field. They already know about existing funding opportunities and some organise projects regularly. However, there is no single source of information or publicity to inform potential new applicants. The wider public certainly do not seem to know a lot about the Euroregions themselves, let alone the small projects fund (STRÜVER, 2004; HÄKLI, 2004). 

One of the conditions for scaling-up is that projects must reach many people and different segments of society. Several hundred thousand participants suggest that these do indeed reach a wide audience. The rule that there should be a roughly equal number of Polish and German participants prevents any obvious imbalances. The many different areas in which projects are organised would suggest that they appeal to many different people. Nevertheless, as the previous section has also shown, there is a heavy reliance on cultural projects. Many citizens might find some cultural themes such as artistic photo exhibitions uninteresting or difficult to access. 

The second condition for scaling-up stipulates that encounters should either cover an extended period of time or to be repeated in order to have a lasting effect. As we have seen, projects vary in length, which can range from one day to a whole year. However, they normally take no longer than a week, which seems too short to engage participants’ interest beyond the project. Still, projects can be repeated several times with declining aid rates. This is done frequently (Interviews PL5 and PL7). Moreover, projects are not intended to be one-off events. According to the rules, they should strengthen partnership permanently. For example, an association could be extended as was the case with the Polish-German-Czech theatre group. When asked about the long-term effect of projects, one interviewee declared: ‘We have made the experience that the majority of the projects that we realise are not one-off projects. They really have their continuation.’ (Interview PL7).

Finally, social capital is more likely to grow if there is a broader effect that links local encounters to a larger framework, such as the regional or the local context. Small projects achieve this to some extent. Many of them have a local reference framework. For example, local fare was presented at the Polish-German culinary fair, while the theatre group in Euroregion Neisse-Nisa-Nysa explored local legends. At the same time, ‘local’ traditions have a very different meaning in the Polish-German borderlands than elsewhere in Western Europe. As mentioned at the outset, Polish-German neighbourship is still very young in this region. On the Polish side in particular, the population has only been settled in the region for sixty years. Few regional traditions originate in the borderlands and there are even fewer shared traditions across the Polish-German border. In this sense, small projects cannot merely draw on local traditions; to some extent, they have to contribute towards building them. 

5)	The impact of the small projects fund in the Polish-German border region
Regional policy-makers and representatives of the Euroregions were equally enthusiastic about the fund in 2009 as they had been in 2005, although one should add that they have an incentive to present it in the most favourable terms possible. There is broad agreement that the small projects fund makes a positive contribution. Still, one interviewee criticised the lack of evidence on which to base this claim:

The more contacts, relations and joint events we organise, the stronger the awareness of the shared border should be, at least in theory. Even so, we do not have the research tools to assess this question. In order to assess it, some sociological studies should be carried out. Can one imagine a situation without the fund and without these projects? We have no grounds for comparison (Interview PL6).

While feedback from the participants in small project is scarce, there is some information about the views of the organisations and people who organise projects. In a survey conducted among such organisations from the Polish side, more than 60 per cent agreed that Polish participants’ opinions of Germans improve during the course of the project (JALOWIECKI and SMETKOWSKI, 2004). In an evaluation of the Phare CBC programme at the Polish-German border, more than 82 per cent agreed with the same proposition (IRC et al., 2006). However, these numbers say nothing about the value of small projects in the region and about their results at the individual regional levels. In order to answer these questions, this section presents some views from the organisations that typically organise projects. 

Interviewees included five Poles and nine Germans from four educational institutions (schools, universities and youth organisations), four economic organisations (trade unions and business organisations) and six cultural institutes. Examples of projects that they had conducted included vocational training, street theatre, music festivals and a festival to celebrate the 2004 EU enlargement, bicycle tours, barbecues and day trips to the other side of the border (Interviews PL9, DE15, DE16 and DE17). The aim, according to one interviewee from a cultural organisation was ‘to bring people into the same room for a while so that they can talk about the same topic’ (Interview DE14). One interviewee from an educational institution described it as a ‘meeting place on a grand scale where people can get together, learn each other’s language, learn to understand and communicate’ (Interview PL8).

Language is generally accepted to be one of the most important factors that shape cross-border encounters. Lacking language skills function as a barrier while an interest in the other person’s language helps to establish more durable contacts (Interviews PL8, PL9, DE9, DE10, DE16 and DE17). Confirming the views of the policy-makers, project organisers argued that Germans are less willing to learn Polish than vice versa. However, interest in the Polish language is increasing. According one German interviewee ‘at the start of the 90s, we had to be cunning to fill our language courses. Today we get 300 applications a year.’ (Interview DE15).

As for the effects of small projects on social capital formation, there is broad consensus that contact in the small projects setting leads to greater trust and liking between the participants. Improvements in opinions of the neighbour have been observed during the course of a project. Polish and German interviewees alike claimed that initial inhibitions and a certain distance – for example between Polish and German schoolchildren – frequently give way to enthusiasm (Interviews PL11 and DE17). One interviewee who organises exchanges between elderly people – who have historically motivated reservations about each other – described the process as follows: ‘Some events succeed. They bring into play the travel experiences that transform people’s grief into respect for the other side.’ (Interview DE14). Thus, in the view of project organisers, small projects contribute to individual trust, an important dimension of social capital. 

Moving from individual cases to the broader regional setting, many noted improvements in citizen relations in the border region since the opening of the border (Interviews DE9, DE11 and DE15). For example, ‘Only now do Polish families dare to speak Polish in German streets. Previously, they would have been afraid of snide remarks of passers-by.’ (Interview DE9). 

According to the organisations that organise small projects, therefore, the thorough face-to-face encounters that take place during these projects contribute towards individual feelings of trust. However, this does not automatically lead to broader feelings of trust among the borderlanders. Polish and German interviewees alike noted a certain asymmetry in mutual perceptions. Accordingly, Poles view Germany as an important partner and show an interest in cross-border projects. Conversely, German borderlanders tend to associate Poland and the Poles with a sense of threat, as they fear crime or cheaper Polish competition (Interviews PL8, PL11, DE14, DE15 and DE16). There were, therefore, mixed views on whether the border region was a site of particularly good relations due to frequent contact, or whether relations were particularly difficult at the border due to mutual, and especially German, suspicions. 

The project organisers’ experiences seem to confirm the findings from the previous, more theoretical, section. Thus, the experiences of project organisers indicate that trust and networks really do develop among the participants of small projects. However, social capital formation also requires a scaling-up of individual trust and networks to the regional level. Asymmetries in Polish and German perceptions of the neighbours do not indicate that small projects and cross-border contact more generally have led to any noticeable increase in the border region’s stock of social capital. 

6)	Conclusions
The small projects fund is an example of government trying to stimulate social capital. This paper provided an initial appraisal of these attempts. It examined the fund in the light of seven conditions and actual cooperation experiences. The analysis suggests that small projects are suited to promote trust and networks between individuals. However, the picture is less clear as far as the conditions for scaling-up are concerned. Scaling-up takes place when participants generalise from their trust in individual members of the other nation to trust in that nation as a whole. Interpersonal trust is thus translated into a broader understanding between the two nations. However, it does not look as though individual trust has subsequently been translated into broader social capital for the region. In the words of one interviewee, ‘It is perfectly possible for a Pole to be good friends with Germans but to distrust Germany and the Germans . (Interview PL8).

By using the conditions of social capital formation as tests of policy design, this paper has identified five areas where the contribution of the small projects fund is limited or unclear. On this basis, one can draw five conclusions that are relevant for policy-makers. 

Firstly, and most obviously, it has been shown time and again that insufficient language skills are a major obstacle towards closer cross-border networking. At the Polish-German border, language skills are more limited on the German than on the Polish side. As the previous section has shown, efforts to address this deficiency have so far yielded limited results. Both sides, and especially the German side, should consider extending compulsory language tuition in schools close to the border. Moreover, one might introduce more advertising and greater incentives for adults to learn the language of their neighbours. The recent publication of the first Polish-language school book in Germany was a welcome development (PRESSE- UND INFORMATIONSAMT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG, 2009). 

Secondly, in order to maximise the impact of small projects, more thought should be given to the bonding that takes place during the unofficial parts of the project, notably in the evenings or during breaks. Some projects risk allowing Polish and German participants to keep separate at these times. As the example of guitar playing around the camp fire showed, it is beneficial for people to interact in informal settings. 
For all projects that involve an overnight stay, for example, it would be possible to ask project organisers to plan for joint evening entertainment.

Thirdly, it was noted that certain organisations conduct numerous projects, while many potential new applicants are unaware of funding opportunities for small projects. Given that most project organisers mobilise their own membership, it would be beneficial to reach the membership of new organisations in order to involve more and different people in projects. This could be done quite easily by publicising existing funding opportunities more widely and by targeting this publicity directly at hitherto underrepresented organisations. 

Fourthly, the previous section has revealed a certain controversy regarding cultural projects. Some, such as fairs or concerts, are seen as excellent mediators to promote international understanding. Other, more serious, cultural projects are seen as targeting participants that are already interested in the other side, contributing little towards improved relations in the borderlands. Thus, devoting 44 per cent of the small projects fund to cultural projects, as Euroregion SNB did, might reflect an overly narrow focus. As noted by some interviewees, other types of projects, such as vocational ones, tap into a pre-existing interest. They are likely to reach some people who had no prior interest in the neighbouring country. One might increase the representation of this target group by reviewing the thematic priorities of the small projects fund.

Lastly, it transpired that some projects are too short to strengthen networks in the long run. Of course, it is not feasible to conduct projects that last weeks at a time. Time-consuming projects would constitute a disincentive for many potential participants. However, one could allow for a greater degree of recurrence, e.g. by providing funding for long-standing endeavours or by permitting projects to be repeated indefinitely. This would help to involve participants on a recurrent basis, strengthening friendships and networks and thus contributing towards long-term social capital formation.
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Table 1: Number and cost of INTERREG IIIA-funded small projects 2000-2006 (2004-2006 for the Polish side)














Figure 1: Small projects by theme in Euroregion SNB 2000-2006



















^1	  Some laudable examples to the contrary include STRÜVER (2004) and HÄKLI (2004).
^2	  All translations into English are the author’s.
^3	  This estimate is based on an email communication from Euroregion Pomerania.
